The choice between sharing and fixed-payment compensation schemes is examined using data on contracts from the motion-pictures industry. The data support the hypothesis that share contracts mitigate the negative efficiency effects arising from hidden action and hidden information. Furthermore, the data provide only weak support of the risk-sharing alternative explanation for the choice of a share arrangement.
, Chisholm (1993) ).
Five data points were excluded due to the fact that the actor was also the producer, thereby removing the potential for moral hazard. Two observations were dropped since they involved television films, which are subject to different incentive effects than feature releases.
Two more observations were omitted since there was no cast credit information. In one case, the film was not a major release (it did not appear in the Annual Index of Motion Picture Credits) 3 and the universe of contracts for the present analysis is major U.S. releases. In the other case, the film was too recent for its cast and credit information to be listed in the Index. A final observation was dropped, since the actor's history involved foreign films to a significant extent.
The remainder of observations comprised the data set used in the empirical analysis of Section IV.
HI. Variable Definitions and Empirical Predictions
A risk neutral producer will offer a risk neutral actor an optimal contract, which maximizes the expected profit of a given film. 2 If transaction costs are zero, the actor will receive a share contract for which the share equals 100 percent. As the residual claimant, the actor will choose the optimal level of effort. 3 However, since effort is costly to monitor, and a share contract is more costly to draft (ex ante) and to enforce (ex post) than a fixed-payment contract, the producer will weigh the benefits of providing the right incentives against the transaction costs of the share agreement. 4 The larger the benefits from mitigating moral hazard, the more likely a share contract will be offered. (Heckman and Singer (1984) Crocker and Masten (1988) ; Leffler and Rucker (1991) ; Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993) ; LaFontaine (1992); Gibbons and Murphy (1992) ; and Crocker and Reynolds (1993) . 6. See Klein and Leffler (1981) and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) for detailed discussions of the reputational effects of career concerns.
7. The length of the contract is assumed to be determined prior to contract negotiation.
8.
"Rentals" reflect the portion of the boxoffice take which distributors receive.
9. This is in contrast to a comedy, in which the comic lead often works with a "straight man."
10.
The genre for eight of the films required examination of the following sources: An (Chisholm (1994) ).
15. This limitation further precludes employing a Cragg hurdle model (Cragg (1971) 29. In fact, as long as the producer is more risk averse than the actor, the empirical predictions will be the opposite of those just described.
